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I nstalled base management is the policy in which the manufacturer leases the product to consumers, and bundles repairand maintenance services along with the product. In this article, we investigate for the optimal leasing price and
leasing duration decisions by a monopolist when the production and servicing capacity are constrained. The effect of
diffusion of consumers in the installed base is considered, with the ownership of the product resting with the monopolist
during the product lifecycle. The monopolist operating the installed base jointly optimizes the profits from leasing the
product/service bundle along with maintenance revenues and remanufacturing savings. We formulate the manufacturer’s
problem as an optimal control problem and show that the optimal pricing strategy of the firm should be a skimming
strategy. We also find that the effect of remanufacturing savings on the pricing decision and the length of the leasing
duration changes significantly depending on the duration of the product’s lifecycle. If the product lifecycle is long and
remanufacturing savings are low, the firm should offer a shorter leasing duration, whereas if the remanufacturing savings
are high, the firm should optimally offer a higher leasing duration. In contrast, if the time duration of the product lifecycle
is low and remanufacturing savings are low, the firm prefers to offer a shorter leasing duration, whereas if the remanufac-
turing savings are high, the firm should optimally have a longer leasing duration. The article also shows that if the
production capacity is small, the manufacturer increases the leasing duration. If the production capacity is very small,
the manufacturer sets the leasing duration to be equal to the product lifecycle and does not use remanufacturing.
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1. Introduction
Across a diverse set of industries, especially in the
business-to-business sector, an increasing number of
manufacturers are transforming themselves from
pure manufacturers to service providers by bundling
the usage of products along with maintenance ser-
vices. Installed base management is a prime example
of a key strategic option adopted by these firms,
which involves the availability of the product and
maintenance service bundle to consumers for a fixed
period of time or usage, hence, it is also referred to as
operational leasing.
Although the cost of servicing represents an
additional cost for the manufacturer, the leasing
arrangement put in place provides a new revenue
opportunity through product remanufacturing, as the
ownership of the product rests with the firm. Through
the leasing arrangement, firms can capture the value
from returned products. This value from returned
products can be extracted by reconditioning compo-
nents for reuse or by completely remanufacturing the
products for resale (Guide and Van Wassenhove
2002).
There are a number of examples of manufacturers
using installed base management in practice. One of
the first firms to switch from selling to a leasing-only
option for consumers, thereby internalizing the main-
tenance costs of its copying machines within the
company, was Xerox in 1960. Since then, the range of
IT companies operating in various forms of installed
base management, include IBM, Unisys Corporation,
and Sun Microsystems (Vaas 1999). HP, Oce, Ricoh,
and Dell, among others, also offer operational leases
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for their products. In addition to these front runners
in technology, there are also a number of companies
in the heavy machinery industry that have adopted a
service leasing approach. Caterpillar, for example,
has shifted its strategy from solely manufacturing and
selling construction equipment to adopting a leasing
and remanufacturing strategy (Gutowski et al. 2001).
Elsewhere, AB Electrolux in the appliances sector
initiated a pilot program called Pay-per-Wash in 1999
for its customers. Under this arrangement, Electrolux
was responsible for the servicing of machines and
undertook to replace them after 1000 washes (this
represented 4–5 years on average). Elsewhere, in the
elevator industry, Otis and Schindler generate up to
75% of their sales volume from providing services
rather than from selling products.
Installed base management is also widely used in
the transportation sector. Mercedes Benz, Scania,
Volkswagen, and Volvo, for example, lease vehicles
and repair services on a pay per kilometer basis.
Moreover, SR Technics, GE Capital, Volvo Aero, and
Rolls Royce offer their customers the option of buying
flying hours instead of purchasing aircraft engines.
Stahel (1994) reports that SR Technics estimated that
it could be more profitable if it leased remanufactured
engines on a per flying hour basis instead of selling
remanufactured aircraft engines. Both Railfreight and
GM offer rail freight leasing and maintenance in addi-
tion to using remanufacturing as part of their overall
offering.
To illustrate the model in the article, we use an
example from Xerox’s High Speed Printing Press to
motivate the assumptions and set up the base model.
The pricing contract used for this particular installed
base policy is dynamic and based on a number of
factors: (i) the amount of products already sold, as
this provides lower costs from remanufacturing some
future products; (ii) the duration that the product will
be leased to the consumer, all consumers lease the
product for the same duration; and (iii) a single tariff
structure is used, as the product usage and mainte-
nance services are bundled together. The market
share of Xerox for the iGen series of digital printing
presses is close to 50%, and Xerox is by far the
market leader in the product category (Xerox 2009).
Maintenance services include mostly scheduled
maintenance, and some repairs in case of product
breakdown. The bundling of the product usage and
maintenance services in a leasing contract is observed
in other products as well (e.g., cars), as the original
equipment manufacturer (OEM) can ensure smooth
functioning of the product by using their own spare
parts and servicing technology. Since the units are
leased by Xerox, at the end of the leasing duration,
Xerox collects the used products and extracts durable
components (excluding the rollers and moving parts
with wear and tear), and remanufactures products by
replacing consumables and non-durable components.
The remanufactured products are similar in function-
ality to the earlier products with software upgrades
and module substitution. The time taken for manufac-
turing a new product or remanufacturing it is typi-
cally much shorter than the leasing duration (less
than a week). Since the operations of the product are
not affected by reusing durable components, consum-
ers do not differentiate between new and remanufac-
tured products, as far as their functionality and
smooth operation is guaranteed. To ensure that
remanufactured products operate at the same stan-
dard as new products, Xerox has a policy of using
components only once for remanufacturing. The pro-
duction of all units is done by Xerox to ensure the
quality of the products, the production capacity for
the manufacturing of the Printing Press is finite.
Installed base management has been widely
studied in the Marketing and Operations literature,
showing the advantages to the firm from following an
installed base policy. In the Marketing literature, one
stream of research focuses on the creation of network
externalities that set industry standards owing to
different types of compatibility following innovation
(Brynjolfsson and Kemerer 1996, Farrell and Saloner
1986, Shankar and Bayus 2003, Xie and Sirbu 1995).
This stream of literature concludes that consumers
should be given incentives to join the installed base
initially, as a large installed base leads to increased
consumer utility from the complementarity of prod-
ucts and services, and through increased network
effects. A second stream of literature examines the
role of lifecycle pricing; in particular, the issues
addressed cover production cost reduction due to
learning, word of mouth and saturation effects, and
the effects of uncertainty about future technological
developments, for example, Dolan and Jeuland (1981)
and Kalish (1983). These studies conclude that a price-
skimming strategy is optimal for increased word-of-
mouth effects, and to give consumers an incentive to
buy future products. Furthermore, Guiltinan (1997)
provides a normative framework for selecting appro-
priate types of services for different mixed-bundling
forms. Day and Fox (1985) examine industry practices
and discuss critical issues raised in prior studies, and
present suggestions for the marketing of service and
maintenance agreements. This article adds to this
stream of literature by modeling the impact of reman-
ufacturing on lowering costs as an incentive for
consumers to join the installed base, and finding the
optimal pricing strategy.
In the Operations literature, Bhattacharya et al.
(2009) compare the policies of installed base manage-
ment and selling with maintenance costs proportional
to the usage frequency, and find that installed base
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management provides more benefits to the firm in a
competitive environment than in a monopoly; how-
ever, they do not consider product diffusion. In the
literature on servicing and maintenance, Cohen and
Wang (1997) consider a lifecycle model of a service
contract, in which the service contract is offered by
the manufacturer in competition with a third party
operator and they examine the product’s price, the
quality of after-sales service, and the price to be
charged for the after-sales service. They find that
the service at the manufacturer and the independent
service provider will be maximally differentiated in
service quality and price with the manufacturer offer-
ing the highest quality. Eliashberg et al. (1997) study
the reserve for servicing needed to back up two-
dimensional warranties such as those offered in the
auto market. So and Tang (1995) determine the
optimal repair policy for a bottleneck machine in a
production facility. They characterize it by showing
that the optimal repair policy must take one of the
two forms: a “repair-none” policy under which all
repairable batches are scrapped, or a “repair-all” pol-
icy under which all repairable batches are repaired.
Groenevelt et al. (1992) find optimal product lot sizes
with respect to stochastic machine breakdowns. They
show that the optimal lot sizes will always be bigger
than the ones in a corresponding deterministic case,
and that the optimal lot size increases with the failure
rate. Sahyouni et al. (2010) consider a repair operation
in which defective items under warranty are returned
to a manufacturer who either repairs these items
using its spare parts inventory or replaces each defec-
tive unit with a new product. They show how fixed
repair capability costs, variable repair costs, inventory
holding costs, and replacement costs affect a firm’s
optimal repair and replacement decisions. Lifecycle
issues are considered by Mesak and Berg (1995) who
analyze the optimal lifecycle pricing of a single prod-
uct with replacement sales. They find that the inclu-
sion of replacement sales in the diffusion model
significantly changes the derived optimal pricing pol-
icy even if replacements were not price-dependent.
Ho et al. (2002) and Kumar and Swaminathan (2003)
examine models in which diffusion is constrained by
capacity. Ho et al. (2002) generalize the Bass diffusion
model under supply constraint and allow for back-
orders and lost sales in a make-to-stock environment.
They find that it is never optimal to delay demand
fulfillment. Kumar and Swaminathan (2003) assume
that the capacity level is given and characterize opti-
mal sales plans under backlogging and lost sales sce-
narios. They show that a heuristic “build-up” policy,
in which the firm does not sell at all for a period of
time and builds up enough inventory to never lose
sales once it begins selling, is a robust approximation
to the optimal policy. Finally, in the Operations
literature, product lifecycle pricing in a remanufactur-
ing context has been studied by Geyer et al. (2006)
who consider a price-independent lifecycle and focus
on finding the optimal component durability to maxi-
mize savings from remanufacturing. They show that
coordination of production cost structure, collection
rate, and component durability is essential for the
maximization of production cost savings from reman-
ufacturing. Debo et al. (2005) solve the joint pricing
and production technology selection problem faced
by a manufacturer who considers introducing a
remanufacturable product in a market that consists
of heterogeneous consumers. They find that high
production costs, low remanufacturing costs, and low
incremental costs to make a product remanufactur-
able are the key technology drivers. Debo et al. (2006)
study the integrated portfolio management of new
and remanufactured products when remanufactured
products cannibalize the sales of new products and
market demand is exhausted gradually through time.
Among their findings is that slow-diffusing products
are the best candidates for remanufacturing. Our arti-
cle takes this literature further by considering leasing
contracts and remanufacturing, and thus internalizing
the time duration that products stay with the consum-
ers before they are returned for remanufacturing.
Under any leasing arrangement with the consumer,
as distinct from the traditional arrangement where a
product is simply sold to consumers, the relationship
in installed base management is one defined by its
continuance over an extended but fixed duration of
time. As a consequence, pricing decisions are more
complex since unlike traditional product purchases,
they involve decisions not only for the price but also
for the length of the leasing duration.
In this aricle, we consider a monopolist manufac-
turer with a constrained production and service
capacity who is operating an installed base which
dynamically diffuses and expands during the prod-
uct’s lifecycle. The rate of expansion of the installed
base is price-dependent and is controlled by the man-
ufacturer through the leasing price and duration.
Consumers pay a price for the utility from leasing the
product and in return they obtain the ability to use
the product and its maintenance for a fixed duration
of time, which is referred to as the leasing duration.
We seek to answer the following questions:
1. How should a monopolist set the leasing price
and duration?
2. How does the remanufacturing option affect these
values?
3. What is the role of the manufacturer’s capacity
level in influencing these decisions?
Depending on the manufacturer’s capacity and the
remanufacturing savings, we identify ranges of
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values of each of these parameters in which the
remanufacturing option has opposite effects for the
leasing price and duration. We find that the firm opti-
mally uses a price skimming strategy for the leasing
price. We also find that the effect of remanufacturing
savings on the pricing decision and the length of the
leasing duration changes significantly depending on
the length of the product’s lifecycle. If the product’s
lifecycle is long and remanufacturing savings are low,
the firm should offer a shorter leasing duration,
whereas if the remanufacturing savings are high, the
firm should optimally offer a higher leasing duration.
In contrast, if the product’s lifecycle is short and
remanufacturing savings are low, the firm prefers to
offer a shorter leasing duration, whereas if the reman-
ufacturing savings are high, the firm should optimally
have a longer leasing duration. The article also shows
how capacity constraints affect the optimal leasing
duration. As the production capacity decreases, the
manufacturer increases the leasing duration until the
capacity constraint is not binding, and she then low-
ers her price to get a higher product supply available
for remanufacturing. Nevertheless, if the capacity is
very low, the manufacturer is forced to use a high
price to match capacity and demand throughout the
product’s lifecycle, and hence, she sets the leasing
duration equal to the lifecycle of the product, and
does not use remanufacturing.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In sec-
tion 2, we present our assumptions, the manufac-
turer’s optimization problem, and the results. In
section 3, we discuss the managerial implications of
our model, and we conclude in section 4.
2. Assumptions and Model Description
2.1. Assumptions
In this article, we consider a monopolist manufacturer
who offers a leasing contract to consumers that con-
sists of a price and a leasing duration,1 as such leasing
contracts based on a time interval or a usage limit are
prevalent and mirror real life applications. During the
leasing duration, products are maintained by the
manufacturer so that their smooth operation is guar-
anteed. As customers arrive, the installed base
expands, and the manufacturer’s requirements for
production and product maintenance increase. We
use the term capacity to refer to the maximum rate of
products a manufacturer can produce and maintain
during the product’s lifecycle, which we denote as TL.
The model is formulated as an optimal control
problem, in which the variables to be optimized are
the price of the lease and the lease duration. The
demand for the product bundle is modeled as a diffu-
sion process, where the underlying demand rate
depends on the consumer’s attractiveness of the prod-
uct (willingness-to-pay), and the remaining size of
the market. The costs taken into consideration in the
model are the production cost per product, and main-
tenance cost. Products can also be remanufactured,
and remanufactured products have a lower produc-
tion cost than newly manufactured products. We
make the following assumptions in the model:
ASSUMPTION 1. The manufacturer’s capacity is con-
strained. The manufacturer can produce and maintain
products at a rate of a units per time unit.
The capacity requirements of an installed base—
those of production and product maintenance—are
an important constraint on the rate of growth of the
installed base. Maintenance capacity involves the
training of people with respect to the characteristics
of the product and such expertise is not easily
acquired in a short-time period. For example, in its
effort to transform itself from a pure manufacturing
firm to a service provider, Xerox hired and trained
more than 10,000 service engineers. Additional diffi-
culties stemming from geographical considerations
make the capacity augmentation of an installed base
difficult. Product maintenance, for example, requires
frequent visits of service engineers to customer sites
and thus geographical proximity to these sites is
important.
With regard to the leasing price and duration, in
this article, we allow for the price to be dynamic while
for the leasing duration, we assume that:
ASSUMPTION 2. The leasing duration is the same for all
consumers.
Consider a consumer becoming part of the installed
base at time t ¼ ~t1, and let t0 denote the leasing dura-
tion. In practice, the leasing duration denotes the
length of time after which the product can be
upgraded with new components and features, to
make the product up-to-date technologically. The
consumer pays a price pð~t1Þ; and leases the product
up to the time ~t1 þ t0, this assumption remains the
same for all consumers up to time TL. To model the
demand diffusion, we denote N(t) as the cumulative
demand at time t, which is equal to the number of
products that have been produced up to time t. We
assume that N(t) diffuses according to the following
diffusion equation
dNðtÞ
dt
¼ _NðtÞ ¼ ðMNðtÞÞððt0Þ  pðtÞÞ; ð1Þ
where M is the market size, Φ(t0) is the market
attractiveness for the bundle as a function of the
leasing duration, and p(t) is the price the consumer
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pays at time t to lease the product for time t0. This
form of demand diffusion only includes the satura-
tion effect and not the word-of-mouth effect; we
make this assumption for tractability. However, in
the product classes that use remanufacturing, the
knowledge of the product is diffused sufficiently at
time t = 0, hence, the word-of-mouth effect is not
significant. The saturation effect has been used to
model demand diffusion in the past for product
classes that are well known to consumers (Eliash-
berg and Jeuland 1986, Kalish 1983). It is to be
observed that the price per unit time (rent) that the
consumer pays at time t is p(t)/t0. Both the price
and the leasing duration are decision variables. Our
demand formulation allows for situations where
after a consumers’s lease expires, the same con-
sumer could lease the product for a second time but
at a different price.
After the leasing duration ends, the product goes
back to the manufacturer, part of the value is recov-
ered by remanufacturing. This value is equal to the
cost savings that come from reusing products and/or
components, and is denoted as Δ. The remanufac-
tured products along with new ones will be used to
satisfy new demand. We make the following assump-
tion regarding consumers’ preferences for new and
remanufactured products:
ASSUMPTION 3. Consumers do not differentiate between
a bundle containing a new or a remanufactured version
of the product as long as their functionality and smooth
operation is guaranteed.
Unlike the case where a consumer buys the product
and is responsible for its maintenance, for the con-
sumer of an installed base, the differentiation between
a new and a remanufactured product is less domi-
nant, as the dimension of servicing becomes quintes-
sential. The consumer pays for the guaranteed
provision of a service for a period of time rather than
for the product itself. This is one of the unique selling
points that is used by installed base firms to attract
customers. Xerox, for example, advertises itself as the
The Document Company putting emphasis on its ability
to provide an integrated and reliable office solution,
rather than focusing on the product and its character-
istics. It is also not uncommon among corporate cus-
tomers in environmentally conscious countries,
particularly in Northern Europe, to be willing to pay
more for a remanufactured “green” version of the
product (Rayport and Vanthiel, 1994).
Regarding product remanufacturing, we make the
following assumption:
ASSUMPTION 4. Products can be remanufactured only
once during their lifecycle and remanufacturing takes
place instantaneously. The product lifecycle is sufficiently
short so that no discounting factor is used.
We make this assumption for tractability. This
assumption is necessary to avoid instances where
each product in the installed base has been remanu-
factured a different number of times, which implies
that for each product the remanufacturing savings are
different, that is, each product has a different Δ value.
In a case like this, Δ could be thought of as the
average savings per product. This assumption is sup-
ported by evidence in the remanufacturing literature
(Debo et al. 2005, Guide and Van Wassenhove 2002).
We do not use a discounting factor for the sake of
mathematical tractability; however, discounting does
not provide additional insights to the model.
In many real life situations, smooth product opera-
tion is achieved by maintaining the products in pre-
specified time or usage limits. For example, as it was
mentioned in the introduction, Xerox uses scheduled
maintenance for its leased units. We make the follow-
ing assumption regarding the maintenance cost:
ASSUMPTION 5. Products need, on average, maintenance
every τ units of time at a cost of cm per product. There
are no product breakdowns between maintenance inter-
vals.
This assumption implies that if a product is leased
for T time periods, the maintenance cost during the
lease duration is given by cm(T/τ).
The notation used in the article is summarized in
Table 1. We proceed with the formulation and solu-
tion of the manufacturer’s optimization problem.
2.2. Profit Formulation and Solution
To construct the manufacturer’s objective function,
we note that the diffusion of the product varies dur-
ing the lifecycle, based on the length of the leasing
duration. Hence, the analysis is divided into two dis-
tinct time intervals, the first time interval is the time
Table 1 Notation Used
Variable Notation
M Market potential
TL Duration of product lifecycle
a Production capacity rate
t0 Leasing duration
p(t) Price at time t
N(t) Cumulative demand at time t
Φ(t0)
Product market attractiveness as a function
of leasing duration
Δ Average remanufacturing savings per product
cm Cost of maintenance per unit per instance
τ Maintenance interval
c Production cost
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before the first leasing duration ends, that is, before t0,
and the second time interval is the duration after that
point and until the end of the product’s lifecycle TL.
We name time interval 1 as the period of time before
t0 and time interval 2 the time thereafter, that is,
TL  t0. Note that these time intervals are of unequal
length. We start by analyzing the profits in time inter-
val 2, which depend on decisions made in time inter-
val 1. We break the diffusion equation (1) into two
parts such that
_N1ðtÞ ¼ ðMN1ðtÞÞððt0Þ  p1ðtÞÞ; t 2 ½0; t0;
_N2ðtÞ ¼ ðMN2ðtÞÞððt0Þ  p2ðtÞÞ; t 2 ðt0;TL;
_N1ðtÞ  a;
_N2ðtÞ  a;
N1ðt0Þ ¼ N2ðt0Þ;
N1ð0Þ ¼ 0:
Under our assumptions, there are two possible out-
comes depending on the problem parameters. These
outcomes are depicted in Figure 1.
By setting the leasing duration, the manufacturer
balances the diffusion rates between the two time
intervals, and as a result, the size of the remanufactur-
ing supply. Since products are remanufactured only
once, the manufacturer has two options. The first
option is to set the price such that the production of
new products in the first time interval (N1(t0)) is less
than the remaining demand of the second time inter-
val, and then to manufacture new products in the
second time interval as well. In this case, the manu-
facturer will make new products in the second period
up to a total remanufacturing supply of N2(TL)/2. In
case A in Figure 1, this supply will be used to remanu-
facture the remaining demand but the manufacturer
might have to sacrifice lifecycle profits by lowering
the price to increase the remanufacturing supply.
The second option is the case where it is optimal for
the manufacturer to underutilize the remanufacturing
supply in favor of higher lifecycle profits. In case B of
Figure 1, the remanufacturing supply is less than the
remaining demand. To see this, consider the case of a
lease with a low price and a medium leasing duration.
In this case, the installed base will expand fast with
many products available for remanufacturing at a
later time. Nevertheless, there might not be enough
demand left and thus some of the remanufacturing
supply will remain unused. In this case, the total
number of products to be remanufactured will be
given by the residual demand in the second time
interval (N2ðTLÞ  N1ðt0Þ). The manufacturer’s re-
manufacturing savings, as shown in the Appendix,
are thus minfN2ðTLÞ=2; ðN2ðTLÞ  N1ðt0ÞÞg.
We solve the manufacturer’s optimization problem
in the second time interval first, by taking the leasing
duration t0 as constant, and then substituting the
optimal value obtained for the price in the second
time interval in the optimization problem for the first
time interval. In the second time interval, during a
leasing duration of length t0 a product will be on
average maintained t0/τ times and the average main-
tenance cost per consumer is cm(t0/τ). We make the
assumption that in the second time interval, if a
consumer leases the product at a late point of time,
his contract for usage of the product for a duration
of t0 will be honored. This assumption is supported
by our observations in the industry. Thus, the model
allows that even if a consumer leases product at time
t  TL, the consumer will keep the product for t0
time units.
Let c denote the production cost of the product. For
a given t0, the profits in time interval 2 (at the end of
time t0) are as follows:
2 ¼
Z TL
t0
p2ðtÞ  c cm t0

 
_N2ðtÞ dt
þminfN2ðTLÞ=2; ðN2ðTLÞ N1ðt0ÞÞg; ð2Þ
_N2ðtÞ ¼ ðMN2ðtÞÞððt0Þ  p2ðtÞÞ; ð3Þ
_N2ðtÞ  a; ð4Þ
N2ðt0Þ ¼ N1ðt0Þ: ð5Þ
In the manufacturer’s profit function for the second
time interval, the first term corresponds to the net
margin of the manufacturer multiplied by the
dynamic demand function, whereas the second term
corresponds to the remanufacturing savings from the
second time interval. We divide the entire time hori-
zon of TL into two time intervals only as the diffusion
equation (which consists only of the saturation effect)
shows that most of the diffusion of products happens
in the early part of the lifecycle. The following pro-
position states the conditions under which constraint
(4) is binding in the second time interval and the
Figure 1 Installed Base Diffusion and Remanufacturing Supply
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optimal price for the second time interval when the
constraint is and is not binding.
PROPOSITION 1. For a given t0, let C3(t0, cm, τ, TL, c) > 0
and C4(t0, cm, τ, TL, c) > 0 be constants that depend on
the parameters of the problem. In addition, let
t2 ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
4C3ðM 4C4a2Þ þ a2
p
þ 8C3C42  a
2C3
: ð6Þ
Then, constraint (4) is binding from t0 to t2 if t2 ∈ (t0,
TL]. In this case, the optimal price is
p^2ðtÞ ¼ ðt0Þ 
a
M at ;
while if t2 ∉ (t0, TL], the optimal price is
p2ðtÞ ¼ ðt0Þ  2
1
42C4  t
 
:
In both cases, the price is decreasing with time.
PROOF. All proofs are in the Appendix.
The form of C3 and C4 is detailed in the Appendix.
We make a number of interesting observations here.
First, note that the optimal pricing strategy by the
manufacturer is always a skimming strategy, where
the usage of the product and its maintenance entails a
higher price in the beginning of the second time inter-
val, and the price is lowered over the remainder of
the horizon. If the capacity of the manufacturer is not
a binding constraint, then the optimal pricing strategy
is skimming, as has been shown in the literature
(Eliashberg and Jeuland 1986, Kalish 1983). Even if
the capacity constraint is binding, the skimming strat-
egy remains optimal; however, the rate of decrease of
the optimal price changes for the case when the con-
straint is not binding vs. when it is binding, and is
dependent on the ratio of the market potential (M) to
the length of the product lifecycle (TL). It is interesting
to note that the skimming strategy is optimal even in
the absence of a discounting factor, as the firm gains
by lowering the price over the horizon in the presence
of the saturation effect. A lower price at a later period
of time enables the firm to increase the demand for
the remainder of the product lifecycle by providing
consumers who lease the product late with an incen-
tive in the form of the lower price.
In the first time interval, the manufacturer’s prob-
lem is to find the leasing price and the leasing dura-
tion by maximizing the total profits, which are given
by
1 ¼
Z t0
0
p1ðtÞ  c cm t0

 
_N1ðtÞ dtþ 2ðt0Þ; ð7Þ
_N1ðtÞ ¼ ðMN1ðtÞÞððt0Þ  p1ðtÞÞ; ð8Þ
_N1ðtÞ  a; ð9Þ
N1ðt0Þ ¼ N2ðt0Þ ð10Þ
N1ð0Þ ¼ 0: ð11Þ
In the manufacturer’s profit function for the first time
interval, as before, the first term corresponds to the
net margin of the manufacturer multiplied by the
dynamic demand function, whereas the second term
corresponds to the total expected profits from the sec-
ond time interval. Note that the second term 2ðt0Þ in
Equation (7) is independent of the price in the first
time interval. The optimal price for the first time inter-
val is given by the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 2. For a given t0, let C1(t0, cm, τ, TL, c) >
0 and C2(t0, cm, τ, TL, c) > 0 be constants that depend
on the parameters of the problem. In addition, let
t1 ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
4C1 M 4C2a2ð Þ þ a2
p þ 8C1C22  a
2C1
: ð12Þ
Then, constraint (9) is binding from 0 to t1 if t1 ∈ (0, t0].
In this case, the optimal price is given by
p^1ðtÞ ¼ ðt0Þ 
a
M at ;
while if t1 ∉ (0, t0], the optimal price is given by
p1ðtÞ ¼ ðt0Þ  2
1
42C2  t
 
:
In both cases, the price is decreasing with time.
In the Appendix, we show that
N1ðtÞ ¼M C1ðt 4C22Þ2;
N2ðtÞ ¼M C3ðt 4C42Þ2;
and thus most of the diffusion takes place at time
interval 1. At this point note, because N(t) is
decreasing in time, if the constraint is not binding in
the first time interval, it is also not binding in the
second time interval.
Propositions 1 and 2 show that the optimal prices
follow a similar behavior for both time intervals while
only their magnitude, and not their time behavior,
depends on the leasing duration. The manufacturer
sets a higher price in the beginning of the product’s
lifecycle, and gradually decreases the price until the
end of the horizon is reached. As in the case of the
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second time interval, if the capacity of the manufac-
turer is a binding constraint, then the constraint binds
from the beginning, until a certain time t1, following
which the manufacturer sets the price unconstrained
by capacity. Note that the diffusion curves are con-
cave increasing in time, since the diffusion governing
functions N1(t) and N2(t) are quadratic in time t. Since
we only model the saturation effect of the Bass diffu-
sion curve, the diffusion models have the high growth
phase early in the product lifecycle, and sub-
sequently, the growth rate is slower. Hence, a high
number of products are sold in the first time interval.
To find the optimal leasing duration t0, we note that
it is obtained by the first-order conditions w.r.t. t0 for
the total profits from both periods. Hence, t0 is the
solution to the following equation
d
dt0
Z t1
0

p^1ðtÞ  c cm
t0


a dt
þ
Z t0
t1

p1ðtÞ  c cm
t0


_N1ðtÞ dt
þ
Z t2
t0

p^2ðtÞ  c cm
t0


a dt
þ
Z TL
t2

p2ðtÞ  c cm
t0


_N2ðtÞ dt
þ DminfN2ðTLÞ=2; ðN2ðTLÞ N1ðt0ÞÞg

¼ 0;
ð13Þ
where t1 = 0 if t1 ∉ (0, t0] and t2 = t0 if t2 ∉ (t0, TL].
Equation (13) cannot be solved analytically in closed
form, as it involves finding solutions to a higher
degree polynomial, even if Φ(t0) is a linear function
of t0. Hence, we conduct a numerical analysis to
find the optimal value of the leasing duration t0 as a
function of the capacity constraint a.
Our numerical analysis for several sets of parame-
ters shows that there is a decreasing relationship
between t0 and a, which is qualitatively depicted in
Figure 2. Figure 2 shows the trade-off between the
profits of rapid diffusion against the remanufacturing
savings possible at a later stage. When the manufac-
turer’s capacity a is very high, the manufacturer
solves the unconstrained problem, and hence, in the
figure, when a is very high, the value of t0 is the solu-
tion of the leasing duration to the unconstrained prob-
lem. If the manufacturer’s capacity is lower, and the
capacity constraint a binds for some time, then during
that time, the manufacturer charges a higher price for
the usage of the product to match capacity and
demand. Since the manufacturer is producing at
capacity anyway, she cannot lower the price to
increase the product supply available for remanufac-
turing, as in the unconstrained case. Hence, the manu-
facturer increases the duration of the lease t0. When
the manufacturer’s capacity a is very small, the manu-
facturer is forced to use a high price to match capacity
and demand throughout the product lifecycle, and
hence, she sets the leasing duration equal with the
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Figure 2 M = 4000, τ = 0.5, cm = 200, c = 1500, TL = 3, Φ(t0) = φt0, φ = 1100, Δ = 400
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lifecycle of the product, and does not use remanufac-
turing.
Figure 3 depicts the optimal prices in Periods 1 and
2 for a high value of a so that the constraints (9) and
(4) are not binding. The optimal leasing duration for
this case is t0 ¼ 1:9. Figure 4 depicts the optimal
prices in Periods 1 and 2 for a = 1850. In this case,
constraint (9) is binding for the whole length of the
first time interval, whereas constraint (4) is not bind-
ing. Note that the optimal price in the first time interval
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Figure 3 M = 4000, τ = 0.5, cm = 200, c = 1500, TL = 3, Φ(t0) = φt0, φ = 1100, a = 5000, Δ = 400, t0 ¼ 1:9
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Figure 4 M = 4000, τ = 0.5, cm = 200, c = 1500, TL = 3, Φ(t0) = φt0, φ = 1100, a = 1850, Δ = 400, t0 ¼ 1:96
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is higher than the unconstrained case, as expected,
while the optimal leasing duration increases to
t0 ¼ 1:96.
Note also that the form of Equation (13) changes
depending on the value of the final diffusion of
products N2ðTLÞ. The form of the profit equation
in time interval 2 depends on the term minfN2ðTLÞ=2;
N2ðTLÞ  N1ðt0Þg. When minfN2ðTLÞ=2;N2ðTLÞ
N1ðt0Þg ¼ N2ðTLÞ=2, the leasing duration is chosen so
that all products from the time interval 1 are remanu-
factured. In contrast, when minfN2ðTLÞ=2;N2ðTLÞ
N1ðt0Þg ¼ N2ðTLÞ  N1ðt0Þ, the leasing duration is
longer and the remanufacturing supply is higher than
the remaining demand.
The effect of the remanufacturing savings Δ on
the optimal leasing duration depends on the prod-
uct’s lifecycle TL as shown in the following propo-
sition:
PROPOSITION 3. There is a TL such that
(i) when TL[TL then
@t0
@
[0:
(ii) when TL\TL then
@t0
@
\0:
The implications of Proposition 3 for setting the
length of the leasing duration for the monopolist are
very interesting. Proposition 3 states that if the prod-
uct lifecycle TL is long, then the value of the leasing
duration should be high if the remanufacturing sav-
ings are high, and should be low if the remanufactur-
ing savings are low. This implies that when the
product’s lifecycle is long, the firm should have a
longer leasing duration to have a higher remanufac-
turing supply as it has a higher capacity to provide
products at a lower cost in the second time interval.
Conversely, if the product lifecycle is short, then the
firm should focus on utilizing the remanufacturing
savings in the second time interval, as the residual
demand in the second time interval drives the reman-
ufacturing savings.
3. Managerial Implications
Propositions 1 and 2 show that at optimality, the man-
ufacturer will use a price-skimming strategy; that is,
lower the price over time for both time intervals. In the
beginning of the two time intervals, prices are higher,
whereas toward the later part of the time intervals,
prices decrease so that the manufacturer can match
the capacity better to demand. Consequently, consum-
ers that become part of the installed base at a later time
in both time intervals will pay a lower price for the
same leasing duration. When the lifecycle of the prod-
uct is long, the manufacturer increases the leasing
duration when remanufacturing savings are high. By
doing that, the manufacturer increases the remanufac-
turing supply while the long product lifecycle pro-
vides sufficient demand in the second time interval for
this supply to be used. However, when the lifecycle of
the product is short, the leasing duration is reduced.
As capacity is more and more restricted, the balance of
remanufacturing savings and lifecycle revenues
becomes harder and for very low capacity, the manu-
facturer will not use remanufacturing.
Obviously, the highest benefit from remanufactur-
ing accrues when all the products in the second time
interval are remanufactured products. If this is the
case, the remanufacturing supply equals the second
time interval demand. In contrast, profits in the first
time interval are maximized when t0 = TL, but in this
case there are no remanufacturing savings. A change
in the remanufacturing savings Δ has a direct effect
to the manufacturer’s optimal policy and to the diffu-
sion pattern for the installed base. Nevertheless, if the
product’s lifecycle TL is long enough and capacity is
high, as the following proposition shows, the value of
Δ does not affect the optimal leasing duration and as
a result the optimal price.
PROPOSITION 4. If TL is long enough (TL >>) and
t1 > t0 where t1 is given by Equation (12), that is, con-
straint (9) is not binding, then
(i) if
ðt0Þ  c[ cm TL

;
the optimal leasing duration is given by the solution to
the equation
cm

t0 ¼ ðt0Þ  c;
and N1(t0) = M/2, or
(ii) if
ðt0Þ  c  cm TL

;
the optimal leasing duration is t0 ¼ TL and it is optimal
not to use remanufacturing.
Proposition 4 shows that when the product lifecycle
is long, the leasing duration is not affected by the
value of Δ. The term (Φ(t0)  c) is the profit margin
per product, whereas the term cm(TL/τ) is the
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marginal maintenance cost when the leasing duration
is the maximum possible and is equal to the length of
the lifecycle of the product. When the profit margin
per product is lower than the maintenance cost, the
manufacturer sets the optimal leasing duration so that
cm

t0 ¼ ðt0Þ  c;
that is, the marginal benefit of leasing a product
equals the marginal maintenance cost. In doing so,
the manufacturer sets the remanufacturing supply
equal to the second time interval demand. In this
case, since profit margins are low compared with
maintenance costs, remanufacturing savings are
important. When the product lifecycle is long, the
manufacturer is able to balance remanufacturing
supply and subsequent demand and use remanufac-
turing to the highest extent. Thus, a change in the
value of Δ becomes irrelevant since all of the prod-
ucts in the second time interval will be remanufac-
tured. In contrast, when this is not the case, the
manufacturer will not use remanufacturing. The
profit margins are high enough compared to mainte-
nance costs for the remanufacturing savings to
become irrelevant.
Propositions 3 and 4 show that the duration of the
product lifecycle plays an important role in terms
of the optimal policies and that these policies vary
significantly as a function of the product lifecycle. A
long product lifecycle allows the manufacturer to
charge high prices and, depending on the mainte-
nance costs, to use remanufacturing to the highest
extent. Proposition 4 also shows that when the prod-
uct lifecycle is long, the relationship between the
profit margin (Φ(t0)  c) compared with the mainte-
nance cost cm and the maintenance frequency 1/τ
plays a dominant role, and remanufacturing savings
do not matter in the manufacturer’s pricing decisions.
4. Conclusions
The practice of installed base management, that is,
leasing contracts for bundles of products and services,
is increasingly found in many industrial applications
and across a wide range of products. In this article,
we adopt a product lifecycle approach and examine
the pricing and usage duration elements of installed
base management, namely the leasing price and the
leasing duration. Our model is applicable in situa-
tions where the service along with the product pro-
vides significant utility to the consumer and hence,
consumers value both components of the bundle. We
also model that the firm has a fixed capacity that can-
not be altered during the product’s lifecycle. While
there has been research in the closed-loop supply
chains area on the diffusion of new and remanufac-
tured products, the issue of installed base manage-
ment, in which the manufacturer bundles the product
with the service, has not been studied before. If the
firm operates a closed-loop supply chain using an
installed base policy, then the remanufacturing sav-
ings obtained and the duration of the product life-
cycle impacts the pricing decisions and the leasing
duration offered to customers. The existence of a
capacity constraint on the instantaneous rate of manu-
facturing also impacts these decisions. The results
provided by our analysis are summarized below.
The firm should price the bundle using a skimming
strategy throughout the product lifecycle.
If the diffusion of the product follows a saturation
effect, we find that the firm should price the bundle
using a skimming strategy throughout the product
lifecycle. The rate of reduction in the price depends
on whether the capacity is a binding constraint.
Although Kalish (1983) and Eliashberg and Jeuland
(1986) show that pricing under diffusion with learn-
ing in unit production costs follows a skimming strat-
egy, we extend those results to the case where the
firm can gain from remanufacturing savings by
remanufacturing products at a later stage, and when
the product and the service is offered as a bundle.
Additionally, in the presence of a capacity constraint
on the production and remanufacturing rate, we find
that when the constraint is binding, the rate of
decrease for the optimal price changes depending on
the market potential and the length of the product’s
lifecycle. If the capacity is low, we find that the firm
should reduce the price of the bundle at a lower rate,
as it can obtain a higher margin, as the instantaneous
demand exceeds capacity.
The optimal leasing duration varies with the remanu-
facturing savings and the length of the product’s life-
cycle.
We find that the effect of remanufacturing savings
on the optimal leasing duration depends on the
length of the product’s lifecycle. If the product life-
cycle is long, then the leasing duration should be long,
if the remanufacturing savings are high, and should
be short if the remanufacturing savings are low. The
dynamics of this result are driven by the number of
units that can be remanufactured later in the product
lifecycle. When the product lifecycle is long, the firm
should have a longer leasing duration to have a
higher remanufacturing supply available later to have
a better ability to provide products at a lower cost
later in the product lifecycle. Conversely, if the prod-
uct lifecycle is short, then the residual demand in the
second time interval drives the remanufacturing
savings, and the firm should focus on utilizing the
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remanufacturing savings in the second time interval
by producing as many remanufactured products as
possible later in the product’s lifecycle.
The capacity constraint increases the optimal price of
the firm, and increases the optimal leasing duration.
As the production capacity decreases, the manufac-
turer increases the price of the bundle, and increases
the leasing duration until the capacity constraint is
not binding, to get a higher product supply available
for remanufacturing. If the capacity is very low, the
firm is forced to use a high price to match capacity
and demand throughout the product lifecycle, and
hence, the firm sets the leasing duration equal with
the lifecycle of the product, and does not use remanu-
facturing. Hence, in the presence of very low capacity,
remanufacturing may not be used, as the firm finds it
profitable to obtain the higher price from the excess
demand over capacity, and prefers not to use remanu-
facturing. Geyer et al. (2006) model the cost-savings
potential of production systems that collect, remanu-
facture, and re-market end-of-use products as perfect
substitutes of new products while facing the con-
straints of limited component durability and finite
product lifecycle with an exogenous price. The results
demonstrate the need to coordinate production cost
structure, collection rate, product lifecycle, and com-
ponent durability. They assume an exogenous price
and they concentrate on cost minimization. In con-
trast, we focus on the effect of remanufacturing
savings and capacity constraints on leasing contracts
and find that capacity constraints increase the price
and the leasing duration. Similarly, Kumar and
Swaminathan (2003) consider a firm that sells a prod-
uct where the demand follows a diffusion pattern,
and the firm may not be able to meet demand due to
capacity constraints. They do not consider remanufac-
turing, and show that the optimal policy is a “build-
up” policy, in which the firm does not sell at all for a
period of time and builds up enough inventory to
never lose sales once it begins selling. In contrast, this
article shows that if the capacity constraint is not very
limiting, then the firm should adopt a policy of setting
the leasing duration to an intermediate level and pro-
duce a reasonable number of products early to benefit
from remanufacturing. However, if the capacity con-
straint is limiting, then the firm should not change
their price at an intermediate stage, and should not
remanufacture products at a later stage.
If the product lifecycle is very long, and the produc-
tion capacity is very high, then the firm sets the leas-
ing duration independently of the remanufacturing
savings.
When the product lifecycle is very long, the firm
can balance the supply and demand of remanufac-
tured products more easily, and bases the decision on
the leasing duration on the difference between the
profit margin per product, and the marginal cost of
maintenance. If the marginal cost of maintenance is
high, then the firm sets the leasing duration to an
intermediate level, and uses remanufacturing to bene-
fit from the savings from remanufacturing. If the mar-
ginal cost of maintenance is low, then the firm prefers
to have a higher profit margin (and hence, a higher
price), and does not use remanufacturing at all, as the
higher price compensates for the loss of savings from
remanufacturing. In the literature, Debo et al. (2006)
consider the issue of product remanufacturing under
the Bass diffusion model with repeat purchases and
varying speeds of diffusion, and show that repeat
purchases may create sales fluctuations, and slow-
diffusing products are the best candidates for reman-
ufacturing. In our model, slow-diffusing products
have a direct parallel with a long product lifecycle (a
longer lifecycle results in a slower diffusion rate given
the same terminal number of products), and given
slow diffusion, the capacity will always be higher.
Our model recommends that the leasing duration
be intermediate for high remanufacturing savings;
hence, the results are similar. However, if the
marginal cost of maintenance is low, the firm should
prefer not to use remanufacturing, as the profit
margin dominates the savings from remanufacturing.
We summarize the results of the model in Table 2.
We make several assumptions in this article that
could be relaxed in future research. We assume that
the manufacturer’s capacity is fixed and cannot be
altered during the product’s lifecycle. In products
with very long lifecycle, additional investments to
increase capacity could be undertaken by the firm.
This would result in different decreases in prices (if
the firm is producing at capacity, adding capacity will
provide the firm the ability to lower its price). Future
research should consider the possibility of capacity
investments during the product lifecycle on the opti-
mal leasing duration. In addition, we assume that
product remanufacturing comes at no additional
cost for the firm. It is not uncommon, however, that
products designed for remanufacturing might require
several investments in new materials and processes
Table 2 Summary of Results
High capacity Low capacity
High remanufacturing savings Low remanufacturing savings
Long product lifecycle
Price skimming, low initial price Price skimming, high initial price
Longer leasing duration Medium leasing duration
Short product lifecycle
Price skimming, intermediate
initial price
Price skimming, high initial
price
Medium leasing duration Short leasing duration
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that will facilitate reuse. If the product’s lifecycle is
short and when the market potential is low, the firm
may preclude remanufacturing as the return on these
investments are not sufficient. In addition, we assume
that product maintenance costs occur in fixed time
intervals, and the cost of maintenance is the same
throughout the lifecycle (no aging effects) and that
there are no product breakdowns and replacements.
We conjecture that the firm would increase the price
of the product bundle if aging effects of maintenance
were to be taken into account (a smaller maintenance
interval or increased maintenance cost over time due
to aging). Future research should take into consider-
ation how the firm’s pricing policies change when
these assumptions are relaxed.
This article looks at the practice of installed base
management, and models the impact of remanufac-
turing on the operational aspects of installed base
practice, when the product diffuses in the installed
base over time. Based on our findings, we propose
that managers can make better decisions on the con-
tractual elements of installed base management for
consumers, and the framework proposed in the man-
agerial implications section should act as a guide in
this regard.
Appendix
For a review of optimal control and the Pontryagin’s
maximum principle, the reader is referred to Kamien
and Schwartz (1991). For the numerical results, we
used Mathematica and Matlab. The Pontryagin’s
maximum principle states that for the maximization
problem
max
uðtÞ
J ¼
Z T
0
Fðx; u; tÞ dtþ SðxðTÞ;TÞ;
dx
dt
¼ fðx; u; tÞ; xð0Þ ¼ x0;
the maximizing u is the one that maximizes the
Hamiltonian function
Hðx; u; k; tÞ ¼ Fðx; u; tÞ þ kfðx; u; tÞ;
and that at optimality
@H
@u
¼ 0;
dk
dt
¼  @Hðx
; u; k; tÞ
@x
:
The function k(t) represents the marginal rate of
change of the maximum value of the objective func-
tion J with respect to the change in x. The terminal
condition for k depends on the assumptions of the
problem with regard to the terminal value of x. In
our case, we allow for the terminal value of the state
N2(TL), which represents demand, to be free, that is,
there is no market clearing assumption.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. The unconstraint Hamilto-
nian is
H2ðt; t0Þ ¼ ðMN2Þððt0Þ  p2Þ  t0cm

 cþ p2 þ k2
 
:
At this point, note that oH2/op2 = 2(M  N2) < 0,
and thus p2 is the unique maximizing solution. The
same holds true for the first time interval, that is,
oH1/op1 = 2(M  N1) < 0. Solving oH2/op2 = 0, we
find
p2 ¼ t0cm þ ðc k2 þ ðt0ÞÞ
2
:
Substituting p2 back to H2, we find k2 by solving
_k2 ¼ @H2=@N2, which gives the following differen-
tial equation:
which gives
k2ðtÞ ¼ t0cm

þ c 4
4C42 þ t ðt0Þ:
Since by assumption the state N2(t) is free and can
take any value at the terminal time TL, the integra-
tion constant C4 is found by using the transversality
condition and setting k2(TL) = 0; hence,
C4 ¼ 4 þ TLððt0Þ  t0cm  cÞ
42ðt0cm  c þ ðt0ÞÞ [0:
Substituting k2(t) in p2, we find
p2ðtÞ ¼ ðt0Þ  2ð4C42  tÞ :
Thus, p2 is decreasing with time. To findN2(t), we have
_N2 ¼ ðMN2Þ ðt0Þ  2
t 4C42 þ ðt0Þ
  
;
_k2 ¼  @
@N2

ðMN2Þ ðt0Þ  t0cm þ ðc k2 þ ðt0ÞÞ
2

t0cm þ ðc k2 þ ðt0ÞÞ
2
 t0cm

 cþ k2

;

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which gives
N2ðtÞ ¼M C3ðt 4C42Þ2;
where C3 is a constant to be found from the condition
N1(t0) = N2(t0). To see when the constraint (4) is bind-
ing, we solveN2(t) = at and find the following solutions.
t~2 ¼ 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
4C3 M 4C4a2ð Þ þ a2
p
 8C3C42 þ a
2C3
;
t2 ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
4C3 M 4C4a2ð Þ þ a2
p þ 8C3C42  a
2C3
;
with t2[t~2. At this point, note that N2ðTLÞ[
N2ðt2Þ[N2ðt~2Þ[N2ðt0Þ, and thus if the constraint is
binding at time t2 is also binding at time t0.
If the constraint is binding, the constrained Hamilto-
nian is
L2 ¼ H2 þ gðat N^2Þ
¼ p^2  cm t0

þ k^2
 
ðM N^2Þððt0Þ  p^2Þ
þ gðtÞðat N^2Þ;
where H2 is the unconstrained Hamiltonian
and gðtÞðat  N^2Þ ¼ 0. We have @L2=@p^2 ¼ 0,
which gives
p^2 ¼ cm þ t0 þ ðc k^2 þ ðt0ÞÞ
2
; ðA1Þ
and
_^k2 ¼ @L=@N^2 ¼ @H=@N^2 þ g ¼ _k2 þ g. We
have
_^k2 ¼ _k2 þ g:
Integrating both sides, we have
k^2 ¼ k2 þ
Z
g dt:
Let
gðtÞ ¼
Z
g dt:
Substituting g(t) in Equation (A1), we have
p^2 ¼ ðc gðtÞ  k2 þ ðt0ÞÞ þ cmt0
2
: ðA2Þ
Then, we substitute Equation (A2) in the diffusion
equation
_^N2ðtÞ ¼ ðM  N^2ðtÞÞððt0Þ  p^2Þ and we
obtain
_^N2ðtÞ ¼ ðM N^2Þððk2 þ ðt0Þ  cÞ  cmt0 þ gðtÞÞ
2
:
Using the fact that
_^N2ðtÞ ¼ a, we find N^2ðtÞ as
N^2ðtÞ ¼M 2a
ðk^2 þ ðt0Þ  cÞ  cmt0 þ gðtÞ
: ðA3Þ
To find g(t), we use the fact that N^2ðtÞ ¼ at and we find
gðtÞ ¼ ððc k2ðt0ÞÞðMatÞ þ 2aÞ þ cmt0ðM atÞ
ðM atÞ ;
and thus we have
gðtÞ ¼ 4
4C12 þ tþ
2a
M ta : ðA4Þ
Substituting Equation (A4) in Equation (A2), we have
p^2 ¼ ðt0Þ  a
M at ;
which is decreasing in time. □
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. We continue to the first
time interval. The unconstrained Hamiltonian for
this time interval is
H1ðt; t0Þ ¼ ðMN1Þððt0Þ  p1Þ  t0cm

 cþ p1þ k1
 
:
Solving oH1/op1 = 0 and _k1 ¼ @H1=@N1, we find:
k1ðtÞ ¼ t0cm

þ c 4
4C22 þ t ðt0Þ:
Substituting k1(t) in p1, we find
p1ðtÞ ¼ ðt0Þ  2ð4C22  tÞ :
To find C2, note that the diffusion of the first time
interval ends at time t = t0. Similar to the case of the
terminal time TL, for the case of t0, we allow for the
demand N1(t) of the first time interval to be free at
the terminal time t0 and thus, at t = t0 by the trans-
versality condition, we have k1(t0) = 0. By letting
N1(t0) be free, we allow for cases where t0 = TL, and
thus remanufacturing will not take place. After solv-
ing we find C2 as
C2 ¼ t
2
0cm þ t0ððt0Þ  cÞ  4
42ðððt0Þ  cÞ  t0cmÞ [0:
Thus, p1(t) is decreasing with time. To find C3, we
need to find N1(t) by solving the differential equation
_N1 ¼ ðMN1Þ ðt0Þ  2
t 4C22 þ ðt0Þ
  
;
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which gives
N1ðtÞ ¼M C1ðt 4C22Þ2:
Using the initial condition N1(0) = 0, we find C1 as
C1 ¼ Mðt20cm þ ðct0  t0ðt0Þ  4ÞÞ2
[0:
It remains to find C3, which can be found by using
the terminal condition N1(t0) = N2(t0). We find that
To find the time t1 where the constraint (9) is binding
we follow a similar way as in the proof of Proposition
1. In addition, for the case where the constraint is
binding, the proof is similar to that of Proposition 1. □
PROOF OF REMANUFACTURING SUPPLY BEING SUFFICIENT.
We will first prove that at optimality, the total
remanufacturing supply from the first time interval is
greater or equal to the remaining demand and thus,
remanufacturing savings are given by the term
minfN2ðTLÞ=2; ðN2ðTLÞ  N1ðt0ÞÞg. We will also
prove that at any time instant t, N1ðtÞ[N2ðt þ t0Þ
N2ðt0Þ, that is, the remanufacturing supply is greater
than the demand for remanufactured products in the
second time interval.
To prove this, we need to prove that
N1ðt0Þ  minfN2ðTLÞ=2; ðN2ðTLÞ  N1ðt0ÞÞg or
N1ðt0Þ  N2ðTLÞ=2
as
N1ðt0Þ  ðN2ðTLÞ  N1ðt0ÞÞ¼)N1ðt0Þ  N2ðTLÞ=2:
To prove N1ðt0Þ  N2ðTLÞ=2; we note that from
Propositions 1 and 2,
N1ðtÞ ¼M C1ðt 4C22Þ2;
N2ðtÞ ¼M C3ðt 4C42Þ2;
in the uncapacitated case (a large). C3 is obtained
from setting
N2ðt0Þ ¼ N1ðt0Þ¼)M C1ðt0  4C22Þ2
¼M C3ðt0  4C42Þ2¼)C3
¼ C1 ðt

0  4C22Þ2
ðt0  4C42Þ2
:
To prove N1ðt0Þ  N2ðTLÞ=2; in the uncapacitated
case, we need to prove that
M  C1ðt0  4C22Þ2 
M  C3ðTL  4C42Þ2
2
;
or to prove that
M  C1ðt0  4C22Þ2  C1ðt0  4C22Þ2
 C3ðTL  4C42Þ2;
or to prove that
M  C1ðt0  4C22Þ2  C1ðt0  4C22Þ2
 C1 ðt

0  4C22Þ2
ðt0  4C42Þ2
 ðTL  4C42Þ2;
or to prove that
M  C1ðt0  4C22Þ2
 C1ðt0  4C22Þ2 1 
ðTL  4C42Þ2
ðt0  4C42Þ2
" #
;
or to prove that
M  C1ðt0  4C22Þ2  0
as C1 is positive, ðt0  4C22Þ2 is positive, and
1  ðTL  4C42Þ2ðt
0
 4C42Þ2
 
is negative, as TL[t0: N1ðt0Þ ¼
M  C1ðt0  4C22Þ2[0 is true by assumption as M
is large, hence, N1ðt0Þ  N2ðTLÞ=2:
Next, we prove that N1ðtÞ[N2ðt þ t0Þ  N2ðt0Þ:
To prove that, note that
M  C1ðt  4C22Þ2[M  C3ðt þ t0  4C42Þ2
 ½M  C3ðt0  4C42Þ2;
which implies M  C1ðt  4C22Þ2[  C3tð2t þ t0
 4C42Þ.
This is true because the RHS is negative, and the
LHS is positive.
If a is not large, then we show that the capacity con-
straint will be binding in the period ð0; t0 for longer
than in the period of ðt0;TL. To show this, we show
that
_N1ðtÞ\ _N2ðt0 þ tÞ:
C3 ¼ 16M
2
ðt20cm þ ðct0  t0ðt0Þ  4ÞÞ2
4
t0cm þ c  ðt0Þ  TL þ t0
 
2
> 0:
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_N1ðtÞ ¼ ðM  N1Þððt0Þ  p1Þ
[ðM  N2ðtÞÞððt0Þ  p2Þ;
as M  N1 > M  N2 and ðt0Þ  p1 ¼ 24C22  t[
ðt0Þ  p2 ¼ 24C42  t.
Since the firm’s supply in the capacitated case is a
combination of the supply from the period when the
capacity constraint is binding and not binding, the
supply will be larger than the demand in the period
of ðt0;TL.
To prove that the firm should use all the available
items for remanufacturing, we define the value func-
tion V2, whose value is the maximum value of the
objective function for the time interval 2. This value
function is given by
V2ðN1ðt0Þ;N2ðtÞ; tÞ ¼ max
p2ðtÞ
Z TL
t0
p2ðtÞ  c cm t0

 
 _N2ðtÞ dtþminfN1ðt0Þ;
 ðN2ðTLÞ N1ðt0ÞÞg:
By the principle of optimality, we have that
V2ðN1ðt0Þ;N2ðtÞ; tÞ
¼ max
x2½t0;t0þdt
Z t0þdt
t0
p2ðxÞ  c cm t0

 
_N2ðxÞ dx
þ V2ðN1ðt0Þ;N2ðt0 þ dtÞ; t0 þ dtÞ:
ðA5Þ
Because of continuity, as d ? 0, we have
Z t0þdt
t0
p2ðxÞ  c cm t0

 
_N2ðxÞ dx
 p2ðt0Þ  c cm t0

 
_N2ðt0Þdt;
and
V2ðN1ðt0Þ;N2ðtÞ;tÞ p2ðt0Þ c cm t0

 
_N2ðt0Þdt
þminfN1ðt0Þ;ðN2ðTLÞN1ðt0ÞÞg
þV2ðN1ðt0Þ;N2ðt0þdtÞ; t0þdtÞ:
ðA6Þ
From Equation (A6), we see that the value function
is increasing when all the available remanufacturing
supply is used. To see this, note that for the case
where minfN1ðt0Þ; ðN2ðTLÞ  N1ðt0ÞÞg ¼ N1ðt0Þ
the value function is increasing in N1(t0), while
when minfN1ðt0Þ; ðN2ðTLÞ  N1ðt0ÞÞg ¼ ðN2ðTLÞ
N1ðt0ÞÞ, all the remanufacturing supply is used
since it is more that the remaining demand (if not all
of the N1(t0) supply is used it is not optimal since
production costs would be by definition higher). □
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. The point TL is found by
solving N2ðTLÞ=2 ¼ N2ðTLÞ  N1ðt0Þ. Let
Fðt0;Þ ¼ @
@t0
Z t1
0

p^1ðtÞ  c cm
t0


a dt
þ
Z t0
t1
p1ðtÞ  c cm
t0

 
_N1ðtÞ dt:
þ
Z t2
t0
p^2ðtÞ  c cm
t0

 
a dt
þ
Z TL
t2
p2ðtÞ  c cm
t0

 
_N2ðtÞ dt
þminfN2ðTLÞ=2; ðN2ðTLÞ N1ðt0ÞÞg

¼ 0;
where t1 = 0 if t1 ∉ (0, t0] and t2 = t0 if t2 ∉ (t0, TL].
We will use the implicit differentiation theorem to
find ot0/oΔ at the optimal t0. We have
@t0
@
¼ ð@Fðt

0;ÞÞ=ð@Þ
ð@Fðt0;ÞÞ=ð@t0Þ
: ðA7Þ
Note that @Fðt0;Þ=@ ¼ @ðminfN2ðTLÞ=2;N2ðTLÞ
N1ðt0ÞgÞ=@. If TL[TL, the term minfN2ðTLÞ=
2;N2ðTLÞ  N1ðt0Þg ¼ N2ðTLÞ=2 and @Fðt0;Þ=
@[0 while if N2ðTLÞ\N2ðTLÞ, the term
minfN2ðTLÞ= 2;N2ðTLÞ  N1ðt0Þg ¼ ðN2ðTLÞ
N1ðt0ÞÞ and @Fðt0;Þ=@\0. In contrast, at the opti-
mal t0 we have
@Fðt0;Þ
@t0
\0: □
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4. Note that, as TL approaches
∞, the constant C3 ? 0 and thus N2(t) is almost con-
stant. This implies that oΠ2(t0)/ot0  0.
Since oΠ2(t0)/ot0  0 to find t0, we solve
H1ðt0; t0Þ ¼ 0) 4Mðt0cm þ c  ðt0ÞÞ
2
ðt02cm þ ðct0  t0ðt0Þ  4ÞÞ2
¼ 0;
subject to the constraint t0  TL, which gives
t0 ¼ min TL;
ðt0Þ  c
ðcmÞ=
 
:
Substituting t0 into the equation for N1(t), we find
that N1ðt0Þ  M=2 if t0\TL. If not, t0 ¼ TL and
remanufacturing does not take place. □
Note
1There can be equivalent cases of the manufacturer offer-
ing a leasing contract with a price and usage limit, these
cases can be handled equivalently by the model in this
article.
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